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In this contribution I take up a particularly troubling issue in the theory of
human rights. It is the issue of intervention to defend or uphold – or re-assert
and re-establish – human rights. The issue is a troubling one because inter-
vention in the affairs of others is always something we should be wary of,
not least because history is full of unhappy episodes of intervention, from
the Spanish in the Americas to the Chinese in Tibet. Indeed, so difficult and
complex are the issues raised that one might be tempted in a discussion of
human rights simply to separate the two matters – intervention and rights –
and deal with them as distinct problems. To the extent that we deal with
both, it might be argued, we should first work out what human rights are,
and then turn to the very separate question of when and how we might
intervene to support them. My contention in this contribution, however, is
that the theory of human rights ought to incorporate a theory of interven-
tion; and a part of the purpose of this contribution is to explain how this
should be done.
Yet here one of the problems confronting the would-be defender of
human rights is the cultural challenge posed by those who claim that
human rights are a western construction that provides no warrant for ques-
tioning, let alone intervening in, societies with very different ethical and
political traditions. An important task for the human rights advocate, then,
is to explain why human rights cannot so easily be dismissed or ignored. The
argument put in this chapter is that human rights have their source in
the good of liberty of conscience – which is a good that transcends cultural
boundaries. Claims of culture cannot be invoked to deny persons such
rights. Furthermore, the existence of such rights provides a warrant for inter-
ventions to uphold such rights. However, there are important limits to the
scope for intervention – limits defined by the theory of human rights.
What I present here, it should be noted, is an argument that has a distinctly
liberal pedigree. Liberalism is often presented as a doctrine of individual
rights. But within liberal theory, particularly as it has attempted to address
the question of what should be the proper framework for a cross-cultural
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engagement between liberal and non-liberal groups and societies, there have
been some important disagreements. Some theorists have argued that liberal-
ism mandates toleration, and perhaps even protection, of culturally different
people, but that toleration has its limits. When groups cease to respect the
freedom or autonomy of individuals in their midst, toleration is no longer
warranted. Indeed, intervention may be necessary. Theorists such as Will
Kymlicka have defended this view, though, typically, all have cautioned
against intervening too readily in societies with illiberal customs since it may
not always be prudent to try to impose liberal values by force.1 In these
debates, I have generally taken the view that toleration of illiberal practices
is warranted not merely as a matter of prudence but as a matter of principle.
What is distinctive about liberalism, I have argued, is not its commitment to
autonomy and its promotion but its reluctance to condone the use of force
to promote values that some peoples or communities reject. What liberal-
ism tries to uphold is not culture but the principle of non-intervention
(Kukathas, 2003).
Does this mean, however, that liberals have to forswear intervention in
illiberal societies or communities whatever the situation? Or is there a point
at which intervention becomes permissible? My concern in this chapter is to
explain when intervention is ethically defensible from a liberal point of
view, and specifically from the viewpoint of a liberal view of rights.
The argument will be developed in six steps. The first section begins by
explicating the concept of a right, and outlining what are human rights. The
second outlines the challenge to human rights doctrines posed by cultural
relativists, and explains why it is important – even though there are reasons
also to be sceptical about the cultural challenge. The third section then goes
on explain how the cultural relativist can be accommodated, if not
answered, by an appropriate conception of the foundations of human rights.
This conception gives special weight to rights of conscience. The fourth
section then turns to explain how and why rights imply the justifiability of
intervention, although section five tries to account for the limits of this
intervention. The final section concludes with an assessment of the relative
merits of the claims of culture and the claims of conscience.
10.1. What are human rights?
A right, to put it most simply, is an enforceable moral claim. If I have a right
to something, I have an entitlement which may justifiably be enforced – that
is to say, it would be justified to exercise force to uphold that claim. (It is not
to say that I may necessarily use force myself, only that, in the end, force may
be used to uphold the claim of a right-holder when claims are in dispute.)
Rights claims are thus very powerful claims. To have a right is to have an enti-
tlement whose fulfilment one can insist upon, and whose pursuit imposes
obligations upon others.
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Rights of Culture, rights of Conscience 111
The concept of a right in modern times has been most helpfully
expounded by Wesley Hohfeld (2001), whose Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning distinguishes four kinds of legal rights.
Individual rights in law might be liberty rights, claim rights, powers, or
immunities. In brief, I have a liberty right to do X if I have no duty (to a par-
ticular person, or to persons in general) not to do X. Thus, if I have a right to
park my car here in the general car park, it means I have no duty to refrain
from doing so – though it does not mean I have a right to exclude someone
else from doing so if he gets there first. I have a claim right to X, however, if
someone else has a duty to let me do X. If I own this property, I have a right to
park my car here, and others have a duty not to stop me, and also to relinquish
that space to me upon request. Some claim rights are held against particular
persons (rights in personam), say as a result of a contract made; while other
claim rights impose duties against all persons (rights in rem), as is the case
with rights of property. I have a power if I have an ability under the law to
change existing legal arrangements, and thus change the liabilities under
which others operate. If I own a car-parking space I may have the power to
sell it, thus transferring the rights that go with it. I have an immunity if par-
ticular persons, or perhaps even everyone, lacks the power to change my
legal position. If I own a property jointly with a second party, I may have an
immunity against the property being sold without my agreement, though
I may have no immunity against his using it for purposes which restrict my
own use of it (say, to park my car).
Hohfeld’s analysis helps us to clarify the concept of a right, not only as it
is used in law but also as it is used in ethics – though there has also been
much debate about whether or not this analysis is sufficient to explain fully
the character of claims of entitlement and the duties they impose. But one
thing this account of rights does not do is explain the content of rights
persons in fact possess. This is not simply because most of our rights happen
to be mixtures of liberties, claims, immunities and powers – imposing different
duties and liabilities on various others. It is because it is not itself a theory of
rights. It tells us what it means for us if we have certain rights; but it does not
tell us what kinds of rights we actually have under the law, or, more impor-
tantly, what rights we ought to be recognized as having.
Theories of human rights are theories about what kinds of rights we
should all be held to possess. These are rights we all have, not because we are
members of particular legal jurisdictions or states but simply in virtue of the
fact that we are human beings. Over the past three centuries, as rights-talk
has come to dominate moral, legal and political discussion in the American,
the European, and eventually the entire, world, the number of theories of
human rights has also multiplied. For some, human rights encompass little
more than an entitlement to acquire and hold property, and to enjoy security
of one’s person and property against the depredation of others. For others,
human rights must include entitlements not only to the forbearance of others
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but also to positive support to protect interests considered common to all
human beings. A particularly striking, and important, statement of what
rights all human beings must enjoy is provided by resolution 217 A (III)
of the United Nations on 10 December 1948: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. This document proclaims that all persons, regardless of race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status is entitled to certain rights and freedoms.
This list of rights specifies the liberties, claims, powers and immunities to
which all human beings should be entitled. In so doing, it in effect identifies
duties and liabilities which fall not only upon individual persons but also
upon states to ensure that human entitlements are properly met. Yet even as
it reveals, through its comprehensiveness, the possible scope of a doctrine of
human rights, the UN declaration makes apparent the difficulty of specifying
a conception of universal rights that is likely to command universal assent.
This is not only because many rights presuppose a level of wealth, or a social
structure, which simply does not exist in many societies – how, for example,
could an entitlement to periodic holidays with pay be upheld for peasant
farmers in a predominantly agrarian society – but also because many rights
either demand some, or call into question other, fundamental ethical com-
mitments. The right to change one’s religion runs up against those religions
which view apostasy as a sin; the right to take part in government runs up
against those states which have remained kingdoms or principalities (even if
not dictatorships); and the right to an education directed to the full devel-
opment of the human personality runs up against the problem that, even
were there any settled consensus on what the human personality in its
fullest development should be, many traditions see the purpose of education
very differently.
It is scarcely surprising, then, that the UN Declaration is marked by a
number of incompatible or inconsistent claims about human rights. For
example, it specifies that education should be free, and directed to the devel-
opment of the human personality, with higher education available to all,
while at the same time stating that ‘parents have a prior right to choose the
kind of education that shall be given their children’. It is no less surprising
that, over the years not only the UN Declaration but also the very idea of
human rights has been called into question. Indeed, according to some,
human rights seldom pick out universal human interests but merely betray
the political dominance of certain cultural traditions.
10.2. The cultural relativist challenge
A complaint often made by those who are wary of human rights is that rights
are a Western concept that is of little relevance in non-Western societies or
cultures. What rights, by their very nature, do is individuate: they identify
and separate individuals as persons, and grant them liberties or claims or
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Rights of Culture, rights of Conscience 113
powers or immunities as against others within the community, or against
the community (if not the world) as a whole. A right is a highly individualistic
notion. Yet many cultural traditions do not view the world in this way. For
some traditions it is not individuality or autonomy which is of especial
importance but community; and the freedom of individuals to question or
dissent from established authority is not highly prized. Moreover, these
traditions often regard the advocates of human rights, and the states they
sometimes represent, as essentially coercive, and argue that any change or
reform within their own communities ought to be a matter for them to
manage without the intervention of rights-wielding critics from outside.
We see this resistance to human rights in a variety of situations. It is
evident, for example, in India where the debate on the question of Islamic
traditions has resulted in the granting to Muslims of their own unreformed
personal laws – laws which are in many respects illiberal in their treatment
of women. It is evident in the United States where some groups, such as the
Pueblo Indians, have resisted the demand that they recognize the right to
religious freedom of their own members. But it is especially evident in the
pronouncements of some national governments that they are unwilling to
go along with the international emphasis on the importance of human
rights. A number of Asian governments in particular have argued that the
notion of individual human rights is alien to Asian cultures, while also main-
taining that their societies’ ‘collective’ right to development requires a very
different approach to government from that which prevails in the west.
This attitude was very clearly expressed in the ‘Bangkok Declaration’ of the
Ministers and representatives of Asian states, meeting at Bangkok from
29 March to 2 April 1993, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/116
of 17 December 1991 in preparation for the World Conference on Human
Rights. While ‘welcoming’ the attention paid to human rights in the inter-
national community, the Declaration’s evident concern was to downplay the
relevance of human rights by asserting – and re-asserting – the ‘principles of
respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in
the internal affairs of States’. This concern is especially apparent in the
Declaration’s wish to ‘discourage any attempt to use human rights as
conditionality for extending development assistance’, to emphasize the
importance of ‘the non-use of human rights as an instrument of political
pressure’, and to reiterate ‘that all countries … have the right to determine
their political systems, control and freely utilize their resources, and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. Human rights, it
seems, are very important – important enough to justify the spending of
increasing sums of money to promote ‘awareness of human rights’. But not
important enough to justify others invoking them to scrutinize or criticize
the workings of states.
There is good reason to be sceptical about such declarations, and about
those who make them. In part this is because the strategy of the Bangkok
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Declaration reveals quite clearly the interest of its proponents in deflecting
attention from their own human rights records, and in weakening the
critical power of human rights. For example, the Declaration repeatedly
emphasizes that human rights should be ‘encouraged by cooperation and
consensus, and not through confrontation and the imposition of incompat-
ible values’; that they should be ‘addressed in an integrated and balanced
manner’; and that primary responsibility for the promotion and protection
of rights rests with the state. When one imagines such sentiments coming
out of the mouth of a Mahathir Mohammad, or a Jiang Zemin, it becomes
plain that reasonable sounding pleas for moderation can be entirely self-
serving. They serve – because they aim – to distract us from recognizing the
essentially immoderate nature of rights.
Human rights claims are immoderate because they are claims devised to
assert the basic interests of human beings against people – usually rulers – who
are not moderate or considerate in their behaviour. They are claims they can
invoke not with the assistance or cooperation of their rulers but when they
are denied that assistance. Rights express entitlements human beings have
irrespective of citizenship or of the states in which they find themselves.
More importantly still, human rights ‘express the principle that when the
governed are oppressed beyond hope of remedy, they have a right to defend
themselves’. This, as Michael Ignatieff explains, ‘justifies the most radical
step human beings can ever embark upon: taking the law into their own
hands’ (2000: 36). It need not, however, mean taking up arms or going to war
but simply appealing for help beyond one’s borders. ‘Human rights create
extraterritorial relationships between people who can’t protect themselves
and people who have the resources to assist them’ (2000: 36).
Yet even while there is reason to be sceptical about the declarations of
those who would distract us from recognizing the interests of people who are
seeking remedies to protect their most basic interests, this does not mean
that no argument is needed to explain why rights-talk is not merely western
meddling. For the challenge to the defender of rights is to say why rights
do not simply impose alien values on cultures which have no need for
them – indeed must repudiate them if they are to preserve their integrity as
traditions with important values of their own.
10.3. Rights of conscience
The question then comes down to a matter of the values that rights uphold
or protect. If rights are universal, the values they defend must be values that
all societies or cultures hold in high regard. If not, rights could quite cor-
rectly be seen as coercive by those who do not recognize the values being
promoted by the critic standing on a doctrine of human rights. If he is not
to be coercive such a critic must be able to appeal to values or reasons which
are internal to a community, rather than simply to ideals which are external
or alien. Is there any such value?
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Rights of Culture, rights of Conscience 115
The most likely candidate, I suggest, is a value which holds an important
place in the history of the struggle for human rights, and in particular for the
right to religious liberty – freedom of conscience. The significance of
conscience is clearly recognized in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of
1948, which observes that all human beings are endowed with reason and
conscience. And the Human Rights Declaration by the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Organization at its 14th General Assembly in Kuala Lumpur
specifies in Article 8 that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience.
But it is not because it is recognized in these documents that freedom of con-
science is significant. It is important because it embraces a number of critical
ideas. First, implicit in the notion of freedom of conscience is a recognition
of the importance to a person or persons of acting rightly. To require a per-
son to act in a way he considers wrong is to impose a very serious demand.
A right to freedom of conscience recognizes that people should not be
required to act in ways they consider wrong. The right to religious freedom
is grounded in this idea: freedom of worship must be upheld because it is
wrong to require people to worship gods they consider false, or worship in a
manner they regard as profane. Second, freedom of conscience recognizes
that people’s ideas of right and wrong differ. Finally, central to the notion of
freedom of conscience is a commitment not to use force to compel belief.
Yet all this said, why should freedom of conscience be regarded as a
universal value rather than merely as a particular, historically and culturally
specific one? After all, the Islamic tradition, for one, seems not to recognize
it inasmuch as it denies its faithful the right to abjure and considers apos-
tasy a punishable crime. The answer lies in the fact that even those who do
not always accept the significance of freedom of conscience invoke their
freedom to go their own way. Indeed, in challenging any imposition of doc-
trines of rights upon their communities or traditions on the grounds that it
would be coercive, such persons or groups are implicitly asserting the
wrongness of forcing people to live by standards or values they cannot
accept. (Significantly, Islam, while it forbids apostasy, is equally insistent in
forbidding forced conversion to the faith.) The human rights declarations
coming out of the Asia Intergovernmental meeting in Bangkok, and the
ASEAN Inter-parliamentary organization in Kuala Lumpur, even as they
proclaimed that ‘human rights exist in a dynamic and evolving context and
that each country has inherent historical experiences, and changing eco-
nomic, social, political and cultural realities and value systems which
should be taken into account’,2 nonetheless maintained that the signatory
states had a ‘right’ to go their own ways, and to non-interference in their
internal affairs.
Freedom of conscience, I suggest, lies at the core of the appeal to be allowed
to go one’s separate way. It is the basis for a very important freedom: to
dissociate from people or communities or traditions or standards one cannot
abide. Now it might be thought that, in fact, it is not conscience that is being
invoked in these cases but the value of non-coercion. Yet it is not coercion
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itself that is the issue in disputes over the import of cultural differences. It is
coercion to enforce standards one party cannot accept.3
If there are any universal human rights, then, those rights have their basis
in the value of freedom of conscience. Those who claim the right to respect
for their separate cultural traditions, and to the freedom to live by their dif-
fering ways have a case, in the end, because freedom of conscience is a value
we should all embrace.
Now, it might be argued, despite my claims to the contrary, that
conscience is not either a universal value, or the best candidate for the value
that rights uphold or protect. Surely not all traditions accept the primacy of
conscience, and historically the idea seems to have its roots in early
Protestant thought in Europe. Indeed, it seems to be a notion that is more
thoroughly individualistic than many traditions could accept. What I wish
to argue here is that, even if the historical origins of the term are European,
the notion picks out something of universal significance. It picks out the
idea that people ought not to be compelled to live according to values they
consider wrong. This idea is indeed individualistic, but the theory of the sig-
nificance of conscience offered here relies on individualism to a very limited
degree. Respecting freedom of conscience demands not only that the con-
science of the dissenting individual be respected but also that the conscience
of the dominant majority be respected. There can be no suggestion that the
view of the majority as to what is right carries no weight. The dissenting
individual may invoke reasons of conscience for his dissent from the major-
ity; but they cannot supply a reason to force the majority to conform to his
conscience. The most the dissenting individual can demand is a right not to
be forced to make his conscience conform to the majority, if necessary by his
being permitted to exit from the community.
To be sure, there will be some members of some traditions for whom even
this is asking too much, and who will demand the right of the group to live by
their own traditions to the extent of enforcing not only standards of right but
also obligations of membership. Islam, for example, will not tolerate apostasy.
The view of conscience presented here, however, suggested that apostasy must
be tolerated, even by those who condemn their dissenters. Dissenters may be
criticized, shunned, excommunicated; but they cannot be forced to conform.
At the same time, however, outsiders have no warrant for demanding that
communities or societies facilitate dissent or encourage their members to
examine their consciences and consider alternative ways of life. They should
be at liberty to preach faithfulness to the community’s traditions, even if they
have no rights over the minds or souls of those who repudiate those ideas.
10.4. Rights imply intervention
Does this then mean, however, that regimes or communities have the right
to rule as they please, to govern without fear that outsiders might intervene
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Rights of Culture, rights of Conscience 117
in their internal affairs? Is this the upshot of liberty of conscience and the
human rights it creates? I don’t think so. There are other implications of
human rights which are not less important and have to be recognized. Most
significantly, rights imply intervention.
The reasoning behind this assertion goes like this. If individuals have
rights, they also have the right to protect or defend their rights. (It does not
mean, I hasten to add, that they have the right to do anything they wish to
protect their rights; and how far they may go to defend their rights will
depend very much on the circumstances, and on the extent to which their
rights are threatened.) However, not all right-holders are capable of defending
their rights themselves. Yet the doctrine of human rights cannot plausibly be
understood to mean that only those who are able to defend their rights can
enjoy human rights. On the contrary, any rights-holder, like any principal, is
entitled to appoint an agent to act on his behalf to serve or protect his interests.
What this means is that rights-bearers can call upon others to assist them – to
act as agents enabling them to exercise their rights, or to defend themselves
in their efforts to do so. Because human rights are not dependent on political
boundaries, since they are claims people possess in virtue of their humanity,
there is no reason to think that rights-holders can only call upon those
within their borders or communities to help them. They can call upon
anyone – and will most likely call upon those who are most capable of help-
ing them. Of course, there may be cases in which right-holders need help to
exercise or protect rights but are unable even to request that help – perhaps
because they lack the resources to do even that, or because they have been
kept in ignorance of the very fact that they have particular rights. But it
would go against the spirit, or simply the point, of human rights to say that
poverty or ignorance could justify some human beings being unable to
enjoy their rights. In these cases it would be defensible for agents to inter-
cede, and to offer to act for the principal rights-holders – even if this were to
run counter to the wishes of those who feel that this amounts to meddling
in the affairs of others. Rights bring with them the entitlement to invite others
to intervene on one’s behalf; and they are also quite consistent with an
entitlement to accept offers of intervention to help one acquire or retain
what is properly one’s own. In this respect, rights imply intervention.
Now, a great deal more remains to be said on this subject. For even if rights
carry with them an entitlement to have someone intervene on one’s behalf,
that does little to establish when, how, or to what extent such intervention
is permissible. There are all kinds of ways in which outsiders can intervene
in other societies or communities on behalf of rights-holders. They can offer
escapees refuge or asylum: in the ante-bellum American south any refusal of
non-slave states to abide by the fugitive slave laws was regarded as an inter-
vention. But outsiders can go further still to intervene, by expressing their
disapproval of rights violations, or imposing sanctions on rights-violating
states – whether simply by restricting official engagement, or by forbidding
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trade with them. Outsiders can impose blockades on states that do not
respect human rights, or fund resistance groups within them or at the
extreme, go to war. Establishing that having a right entitles one to have others
intervene on one’s behalf does not establish what degree of intervention is
justifiable – or, for that matter, prudent. But all I have sought to establish up
to this point is not a case for intervention to protect human rights, but the
principle that to have a right is to have something which cannot be dimin-
ished because one is powerless on one’s own, or in one’s community.
Moreover, those wielders of power in their states or communities who assert
that outsiders have no right to intervene in their societies are mistaken as a
matter of principle. Outsiders do have that right. They have that right when
they are empowered by those within those societies to act as their agents for
the defence and exercise of their rights.
10.5. The limits of intervention
Nonetheless, there are important limits to intervention, some of which stem
from the very nature and basis of human rights. The mere fact of a request
for intervention to protect or restore human rights does not establish even a
prima facie case for intervention. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in
1979 was nothing less than an invasion in spite of the ‘request’ from the
Afghan government, since that government was nothing other than a puppet
regime established after years of Soviet interference to create the conditions
suitable to its own strategic interests. A similar point might be made about
Hitler’s intervention in the Sudetenland, which purported to protect the
claims of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, when in fact it served only
the Nazis’ territorial aims.
But even genuine requests for intervention do not establish a case for
interference in the affairs of another community. Even if those calling for
assistance are correct in thinking that their rights have been violated, their
societies may well have the institutions of justice necessary to address their
grievances. Sometimes unaddressed rights violations are simply yet to be
addressed violations.
Yet there are principled limits to intervention more fundamental still.
Although rights carry with them an entitlement to empower agents to
uphold the rights of principals, they do not entitle those agents to violate
the rights of third parties. Thus any intervention must consider not only the
rights of those on whose behalf the action is taken but also the rights of
those whom such action might adversely affect. The point here is not simply
that interveners must be cautious because intervention is a clumsy tool, dif-
ficult to use with precision. The point is that there are limits to the kinds of
intervention permissible given the nature of human rights. One of the rea-
sons some people do not enjoy certain rights within their own communities
or states is that the society does not recognize the rights in question as rights
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Rights of Culture, rights of Conscience 119
at all, even if they respect a range of other rights. For example, a Muslim state
may not respect the freedom of Muslims to abjure Islam, since that is not a
freedom that Muslims recognize. If the basis of human rights is a respect for
freedom of conscience, the defenders of human rights here would have to
consider the conscientious beliefs not only of the dissenting apostates but
also the no less conscientious convictions of the Muslim majority for whom
apostasy is a crime. In such circumstances it would be hard to justify inter-
vention to force the majority to change its convictions; though not difficult
to justify intervention in the form of offering dissenters asylum.
Indeed, in most cases intervention may be justified only to the extent of
rescuing those whose rights are violated to enable them to live according to
their own convictions in freedom. Rights may seldom provide a sufficient
basis for invasion of another society to alter its fundamental legal and polit-
ical structure. Such a case would only arise when the request for aid comes
from a majority or the whole of a society whose members have had their
rights traduced.
10.6. Culture and conscience
What is the place of human rights in a world in which cultures and cultural
values often come into conflict? According to some, rights have a limited
place because they must, in the end, be subordinated to cultural concerns –
concerns which are best protected not by human rights but by a very different
moral idea: the doctrine of sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, it is those nation
states with uninspiring human rights credentials which are usually quickest
to invoke the importance of sovereignty, as the Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur
declarations reveal. It is the argument of this chapter, however, that while
sovereignty may have its uses, it is on the whole a notion which should not
be overrated. Human rights have an important role to play in protecting
people from the ravages of culture and its demands for conformity. But
rights are no less capable of drawing the boundaries defining the proper
scope of intervention in the cultural life of others. Rights of conscience form
the basis of human rights, and in so doing also supply culture and community
with as much protection as they deserve.
Notes
1. See Kymlicka (1995). For a less cautious view, see Barry (2001).
2. Preamble to the Human Rights Declaration by the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary
Organization.
3. Of course, it goes without saying that it would be a mistake to assume that those
invoking freedom of conscience are never disingenuous – particularly when those
doing the invoking are repressive nation-states.
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